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Abstract 
 
The increasing use of incentive pay schemes in recent years has raised concerns about their 
potential detrimental effect on intrinsic job satisfaction (JS), job security and employee morale.  
This study explores the impact of pay incentives on the overall job satisfaction of workers in the 
UK and their satisfaction with various facets of jobs.  Using data from eight waves (1998-2005) 
of the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS) and a uniquely-designed well-being dataset 
(EPICURUS), a significant positive impact on job satisfaction is only found for those receiving 
fixed-period bonuses.  These conclusions are robust to unobserved heterogeneity, and are shown 
to depend on a number of job-quality characteristics that have not been controlled for in previous 
studies.   
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1. Introduction 
 
When faced with the classical agency problem, whereby the interests of the firm and the worker are 
misaligned, employers have an incentive to design reward mechanisms that induce employees to act in 
their best interests.  Mirlees (1976) and Holmström (1979) were among the first to demonstrate the 
theoretical dominance of performance-related pay (PRP) over alternative reward systems when 
monitoring the effort of an agent is imperfect.  Indeed, such incentive schemes have increasingly found 
favour in many organisations in the UK and other advanced Western economies (Murphy, 1999) as they 
have been considered to be the firm’s solution to the problem of ‘moral hazard’ that exists in the 
workplace. 
Notwithstanding the substantial insights that agency analysis has offered, a number of shortcomings 
have been pointed out.  The thrust of these arguments is that the introduction of incentive pay schemes 
may lead to dysfunctional behavioural responses when the employees are engaged in “multitasking” 
(Holmström and Milgrom, 1991; Baker, 1992).  Subjective appraisal, believed to be capable of rewarding 
a more holistic evaluation of performance, is no less contentious, as it may lead to rent-seeking on behalf 
of workers and distortionary evaluations by supervisors (Prendergast, 1999).  Added to these problems are 
assertions that financial incentives are likely to undermine collaboration and team work (Milgrom and 
Roberts, 1992), emphasize the power asymmetry between management and workforce and reduce risk 
taking, creativity and innovation (Kohn, 1993).  In addition, non-economic concerns have been raised 
postulating that the use of extrinsic incentives may erode intrinsic motivation and satisfaction, with 
adverse effects on productivity and profitability (Deci, 1971; Lepper et al, 1973).  These claims, which 
constitute ‘one of the most important anomalies in economics’ (Frey and Jegen, 2001), have, nonetheless, 
not been mirrored in the empirical evidence reported by economists.  For example, Lazear (2000) shows 
significant positive effects of incentive pay on productivity in his unique dataset of a firm that 
exogenously changed its established compensation plan.  Nevertheless, it may be that economists have 
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identified the short run benefits of incentives, and any long run negative effects on employee motivation 
and job satisfaction (JS) postulated by psychologists have yet to be witnessed in the data.  
A careful examination of the link between PRP and JS may therefore unveil significant insights into 
the workings of incentive pay and its consequences for employee morale and productivity.  It is, thus, the 
primary aim of this paper to examine how the increasingly changing nature of compensation methods has 
affected attitudes towards work.  To do so the practice of a growing number of economists, who use self-
reported JS data to proxy individual utility, is followed.  Based on the reasoning of conventional 
microeconomic models no significant differences in JS are expected between the marginal workers 
receiving PRP and those paid a fixed salary.  Nonetheless, the disparity in the psychological processes 
and in the workplace environments of these two types of workers leads to the expectation that salient 
differences in utility could arise, especially in a world of imperfect labour mobility.            
This paper builds on a number of recent studies that have examined the extent to which PRP may 
affect the satisfaction that workers receive from their jobs (Drago et al, 1992; McCausland et al., 2005; 
Heywood and Wei, 2006; Pouliakas, 2007; Artz, 2008; Green and Heywood, 2008; Cornelissen et al., 
2008).  Significant heterogeneity has been found in the estimates of this research, such as PRP being 
primarily conducive to the well-being of risk tolerant individuals (Cornelissen et al., 2008), males (Artz, 
2008), unionized workers (Green and Heywood, 2008), the higher-paid (McCausland et al., 2005) and 
those who are employed in larger firms (Artz, 2008).  Fixed-effects estimates have also been used to 
control for the impact of a number of time-invariant individual and firm-specific characteristics that may 
cause spurious correlation between PRP on JS, such as worker ability and the nature of the job task 
(Pouliakas, 2007; Green and Heywood, 2008).  Nevertheless, to date no study has examined the influence 
of particular characteristics describing the quality of the workplace (e.g. whether it is dangerous, noisy, 
hot, dirty etc.) and the nature of the job task (e.g. hard work, repetitiveness, autonomy, rotating teams 
etc.) as moderators of the relationship between PRP and JS, mainly due to the unavailability of 
appropriate data. 
 4 
In this study the effect of PRP on the overall JS and on satisfaction with various aspects of jobs is 
firstly estimated using eight waves (1998-2005) of the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS), a large 
representative panel sample of UK employees.  The model specification is then replicated on a new 
unique dataset, the EPICURUS database.  Though not directly comparable with the BHPS, the latter 
dataset is used as it has been specifically designed to examine the relationship between the well-being of 
workers and a whole host of job-quality variables that are typically unavailable in large household 
surveys.  In this manner, the robustness of the significant positive impact of bonuses on JS, which has 
been found in the literature, is confirmed.  Importantly, the interaction between a number of important 
variables, describing either the nature of the job task or the quality of the workplace, and PRP is also 
shown to be a significant determinant of the satisfaction that workers derive from their employment.  
The remainder of the chapter is organised as follows.  In the next section the theoretical predictions 
regarding the incentives-job satisfaction relationship are examined.  In section 3 the data are described 
and summary statistics are displayed.  Section 4 details the econometric methodology used.  The 
estimates of the JS regressions are then presented in section 5.  Concluding remarks are made in section 6. 
 
2. Job Satisfaction and Incentives 
 
While the literature on happiness and well-being has advanced at a rapid pace (Freeman, 1978; Clark and 
Oswald, 1996; Clark, 1997; Layard, 2005; Blanchflower and Oswald, 2004; EPICURUS, 2007), and the 
theory of firms’ choice of incentive contracts is firmly rooted in the agency problem (Mirlees, 1976; 
Homstrom, 1979; Holmstrom and Milgrom, 1987), only recently has the impact of financial incentives on 
JS received any attention.  From conventional economic thought it is well-known that due to the existence 
of information asymmetries that result in a conflict of interests between a risk-neutral principal and a risk-
averse agent, an efficient contract must balance the goals of full insurance and first-best incentives.  At 
the optimum, given the agent’s inherent disutility for exerting effort, a firm can induce higher levels of 
effort by tying the agent’s compensation to random realisations of his/her output.  Choosing to do so, 
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however, implies that the expected value of the agent’s wages must compensate him/her for the risk 
intrinsic in the production process and the disutility of the extra effort.  It follows that the (reservation) 
utility of individuals who receive performance-enhancing pay should, in equilibrium, be equal to that of 
non-recipients.  
As formalized in Pouliakas (2007), the above prediction may not necessarily hold in the presence of 
imperfect labour mobility, since it requires time for the sorting behaviour described by Lazear (1986; 
2000) to take effect.  Belfield and Marsden (2003), for instance, report a significant experimentation and 
learning-by-doing process in the implementation of suitable compensation strategies by managers, with a 
significant proportion of workplaces operating ‘wrong’ remuneration schemes, in the sense that they do 
not match the conditions of their monitoring environment.  In this case, the introduction of PRP schemes 
by firms may be associated with lower mean JS, given that for those agents for whom the marginal cost of 
effort is dear compensation schemes which reward performance will be less attractive.  In contrast, 
Heywood and Wei (2006) have emphasised that PRP generates the maximum surplus for workers, as it 
allows them to put forth infra-marginal effort that achieves a more complete optimization of their utility 
compared to other payment arrangements. 
Psychological literature has also argued that once one allows for the fact that rational individuals may 
receive intrinsic satisfaction from their jobs, extrinsic intervention may trigger psychological responses 
that will alter the agent’s utility.  This forms the basis of cognitive evaluation theory (Deci and Ryan, 
1985), which asserts that the ultimate effect of performance-contingent compensation on individual 
motivation depends on its impact on perceived self-determination and esteem.  If incentives are perceived 
by individuals as being supportive, they facilitate worker autonomy and foster self-esteem, thus enlarging 
self-determination.  In this case intrinsic motivation is crowded-in, and PRP schemes should enhance JS.  
In contrast, rewards that are regarded as controlling may cause “distaste for the required effort” (Kreps, 
1997, p. 362).i  Such a shift in the locus of control will subsequently crowd-out the utility that employees 
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derive from work, giving rise to the so-called ‘hidden cost of reward’ (Frey, 1997; Frey and Jegen, 2001; 
Fehr and Falk, 2002).   
In the face of the above arguments, it is expected that monetary inducements are unlikely to have a 
neutral effect on the subjective JS scores of individuals.  Specifically, the ultimate effect of PRP on mean 
JS is likely to depend on the relative proportions of intrinsically and extrinsically motivated agents that 
are employed in the workplace, as well as on the impact that PRP has on the psychological disposition of 
intrinsically-motivated individuals.  It will also hinge on the extent to which the mobility of labour will 
permit workers whose utility has been adversely affected by the offer of PRP to move to alternative 
employment that suits their preferences best.ii                         
Added to the above are assertions that financial incentives are likely to alter a recipient’s absolute and 
relative level of pay, both of which are known to be significant determinants of JS (Clark and Oswald, 
1996; Clark, 1999; Grund and Sliwka, 2005; Ferrer-i-Carbonell, 2005; Panos and Theodossiou, 2009).  
Given the overwhelming evidence that workers attach an equal (or even greater) value to other facets of 
their jobs besides wages (Van Praag et al., 2003; Skalli et al., 2008), it is also expected that PRP will 
affect overall attitudes towards work by influencing individual perceptions of the security of employment, 
of inter-personal relationships and of equity and fairness, inter alia.  For instance, aggressive PRP 
systems may be detrimental to employee morale as it conflicts with the inherent preference of employees 
for horizontal equity arrangements, which treat workers of ‘comparable worth’ at the same level of an 
organization “fairly” and “equally” (Baker et al., 1988).  In addition, firms that rely on work incentives to 
motivate employee effort are less likely to foster ongoing worker-firm attachments for that purpose 
(Drago and Heywood, 1995), thus compromising job security (Valetta, 1999).iii  Nevertheless, it might 
also be true that the provision of variable pay may provide firms with sufficient flexibility to avoid layoffs 
during periods of weak demand, in which case the incidence of PRP could ultimately enhance job tenure.  
It is also likely to be the case that in those circumstances in which PRP may require subjective evaluation 
(for instance, when the problem of multitasking is more acute), there may be employee discontent as they 
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may feel that their supervisor’s appraisal is not a fair reflection of their performance.  Finally, it has been 
asserted that explicit incentives are likely to undermine collaboration and team work (Milgrom and 
Roberts, 1992; Marsden and French, 1998), emphasize the power asymmetry between management and 
workforce, and reduce risk taking, creativity and innovation (Kohn, 1993).  
The above analysis makes clear that ultimately the impact of PRP on JS is an empirical question, and 
is likely to vary substantially in response to a number of individual- and/or job-related characteristics and 
across different facets of the employment contract.  Previous studies that have explored this association 
have indeed confirmed the significant heterogeneity in estimates.  Green and Heywood (2008), Artz 
(2008) and Cornellisen et al. (2008) have highlighted that performance-based pay exerts a significant 
impact on the JS of males who are more risk-tolerant and who are predominantly employed in unionized 
jobs and within larger-sized firms.  McCausland et al. (2005) also showed that once the sorting effects of 
PRP are taken into consideration, PRP is only likely to affect the utility of higher-paid workers, as the risk 
inherent in variable-pay schemes may de-motivate lower-paid staff.  Moreover, Pouliakas (2007) and 
Green and Heywood (2008) showed that only bonuses and profit-sharing schemes result in higher JS in 
the UK, while the effect of individually-linked rewards is correlated with unobserved heterogeneity.  
Those authors also examine a fuller set of partial job satisfactions and find that PRP has a significant 
impact on the facets of ‘pay’, ‘job security’ and ‘hours worked’, while the insignificant impact on the 
‘work itself’ casts doubt on the validity of the motivation crowding–out theory.  Finally, Drago et al. 
(1992) and Heywood and Wei (2006) reveal positive effects of PRP on the JS of Australian and US 
employees, respectively.  
As most of the above studies have relied on large household panel surveys (e.g. BHPS, GSOEP, 
NLSY), variables describing intrinsic features of the workplace environment and of the nature of the job 
task have been missing from the analysis.  In particular, the interaction between such job-specific 
variables and the offer of PRP is expected to be a significant determinant of individual JS.  For example, 
Fernie and Metcalfe (1999), McLeod and Parent (1999) and Belfield and Marsden (2003) have 
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emphasized that the monitoring environment of the workplace is a crucial factor in firms’ decisions of the 
appropriate method of compensation.  Pouliakas and Theodossiou (2009) have also illustrated that 
characteristics of the workplace environment are significant determinants of the perceived effectiveness 
of monetary incentives by the employees themselves.  Nevertheless, previous studies have been unable to 
incorporate such elements into the analysis, and have resorted to the use of time-demeaning in order to 
purge their overall effect.    
This paper aims to explicitly take such job-related features into account when investigating the 
relationship between incentive pay and employee well-being.  To do so, the analysis firstly utilizes data 
from eight waves (1998-2005) of the BHPS, corroborating the results of previous findings in the 
literature.  It is argued that the marked discrepancy between OLS and fixed effects estimates is indicative 
of the presence of unobserved individual and job effects.  A new and unique dataset, the EPICURUS 
database, which has been explicitly designed to investigate the relationship between workplace 
characteristics and employee well-being in Europe, is then utilized.  Using a similar specification to that 
used in household surveys, a number of previously unavailable job-specific variables are subsequently 
introduced in the analysis.  It is hence shown that amongst all types of incentive pay, only fixed bonuses 
have a significant positive effect on overall JS.  Moreover, the interaction between particular features of 
the work environment and PRP is found to exert an important influence on job utility.  
 
3. Data and Job Satisfaction Measures 
This study uses data from waves 8 to 15 (1998-2005) of the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS), as 
well as the unique cross-sectional EPICURUS database for the year 2004, both of which are described in 
detail below.   
The BHPS is a nationally representative survey that each year interviews a random sample of nearly 
10,000 individuals in approximately 5,500 British households, the addresses of which are taken from the 
National Postcode Address File.  It has been conducted annually since late 1991 and contains a wealth of 
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information on employees’ personal and employment characteristics.  Respondents in employment are 
also asked about their satisfaction with seven specific facets of their jobs (promotion prospects, total pay, 
relations with supervisors, job security, ability to work on their own initiative, the actual work itself and 
hours of work) evaluated on a seven point scale (where a value of one corresponds to ‘not satisfied at all’ 
and seven reflects ‘complete satisfaction’).  The questions regarding promotion prospects, relations with 
boss, and the use of initiative were discontinued after the seventh wave.  Subsequent to their rating of the 
various partial satisfactions of a job, individuals are asked a final question regarding overall job 
satisfaction, worded as follows: “All things considered, how satisfied or dissatisfied are you with your 
present job overall using the same 1-7 scale?”  As in most empirical work in this field, this study 
employs these job satisfaction questions to identify the determinants of the quality of employment as 
perceived by the individual workers themselves.    
The sample is restricted to individuals between 16 and 65 years of age who are in employment (both 
full and part-time) at the survey date.  Those who are self-employed, retired, work in the armed forces and 
live in Northern Ireland are excluded.  For waves 8 to 15 of the BHPS this yields 57,438 observations on 
13,752 different individuals.  A sizeable portion of this sample (15%) corresponds to individuals that 
replied affirmatively to the question: “Does your pay include performance related pay”?  This is the main 
question in the BHPS capturing the presence of pay incentives that are based on individual employee 
performance.  A follow-up question also attempts to distinguish the component of pay that is usually 
supplemented via irregular bonuses and commissions, or rewards based on some measure of overall 
company performance, such as profits.  Specifically, the respondents are asked “In the last 12 months 
have you received any bonuses such as a Christmas or quarterly bonus, profit-related pay or profit 
sharing bonus, or an occasional commission?”  Approximately 29% of the employees in the sample 
declare to be recipients of such forms of compensation.  This variable is included in the empirical analysis 
as an indicator of gain-sharing (GS) schemes.  A more insightful look at the composition of the various 
incentive options that firms employ as part of their human resource toolkit reveals that 64.22% of 
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individuals in the sample receive none of the two contingent-pay schemes described above, 6.47% and 
20.79% are sole recipients of individual PRP and GS, respectively, while the pay of the remaining 8.51% 
is characterized by both PRP and GS elements. 
The EPICURUS data have been collected as part of a survey of workers in lower- and middle-skilled 
occupations that was undertaken as part of the EU-funded EPICURUS project in August and September 
2004 in seven European countries (Denmark, Finland, France, Greece, the Netherlands, Spain and the 
UK).  A specialized survey company was used to ensure that appropriate dissemination and data 
collection procedures were followed.  Moreover, due to time and budget considerations it was decided 
that a homogenous group of individuals should be chosen.  The final sample therefore includes salaried 
workers (excluding students) whose employment is the main activity, employed in all industries except 
agriculture and fishery, between the ages of 18 to 65, with a maximum educational level of 4 in the 
ISCED International Classification of 1997.  For the purposes of this study we use the UK questionnaire 
only, which was administered online via the Internet.  This led to a sample of 1.002 random respondents.    
The contents of the questionnaire are fairly extensive in terms of information about the individual 
respondent, her/his household and his/her current job situation.  In comparison with large household 
surveys, the EPICURUS database is far more precise about the contents of the job, especially in terms of 
working conditions.  A larger set of subjective information is also available encompassing general 
opinions about the individual’s employment (on a 1-10 Likert scale with 10 reflecting ‘complete 
satisfaction’) and contains answers to as much as thirteen specific domains of the job.  This allows a more 
detailed study of the dependence of JS on a set of traditionally overlooked job features, such as the quality 
of work conditions and the intensity and interest of the job (EPICURUS, 2007).  It is also possible to 
examine closer the interaction of the latter job measures with various compensation policies pursued by 
UK organizations. 
Respondents were asked specific questions about the composition of their remuneration package.  
Specifically, after being invited to answer a series of questions on their personal incomes, there were 
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queried about the receipt of any extra payments from their main job.  Two of the options included were 
“received extra payments such as bonus and stock options”, and “received end of the year bonus”, which 
led to 23.75% and 21.36% positive responses, respectively.  The survey also revealed that in 10.28% of 
the cases the employees’ circumstances in the main job were characterized by an individual-based 
“performance/merit-related payment system”.  The frequencies of the EPICURUS sample are comparable 
to those of the BHPS, with 59.38% of the sample receiving no form of contingent-pay compensation, 
28.24% being recipients of either of the three incentive devices, while the pay of the residual 12.38% 
consists of some combination of these.  The correlation coefficients between alternative combinations of 
the compensation options do not exceed 0.24 in either case, indicating that these consist of relatively 
separate motivational instruments.     
Table 1 illustrates descriptive statistics from both datasets, highlighting the differences in the 
characteristics of those employees who receive at least one form of reward from their employment and 
those who do not.  It is apparent that the percentage of male, young and non-unionized workers is higher 
among those receiving incentive pay than it is among those on alternative wage schemes.  Employees 
whose remuneration is broadly linked to their performance are also more likely to be in full-time, 
permanent, private sector jobs offering promotion opportunities.  They are found primarily among 
managerial/administrative and sales occupations and in larger firms.  They also receive higher mean 
wages, although they work a greater average number of hours.  They are characterized by a higher 
incidence of shift work, teamwork and usually work on jobs involving a variety of duties.  Their jobs tend 
to be repetitive and require working under tight deadlines and high speed, often resulting in fatigue.  A 
greater proportion of employees receiving incentive rewards declare to be in safer and of superior quality 
jobs relative to those on time rates.  Finally, fewer people receiving extrinsic compensation enjoy good 
relationships with their colleagues, though they are in better terms with their supervisors.  No major 
differences seem to exist with respect to educational qualifications, marital status and working time 
patterns.      
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[INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
 
The mean JS by facets of jobs and method of pay is displayed in Table 2.  Interesting patterns 
emerge, with individuals in receipt of any form of performance incentive (bonuses or PRP) reporting 
higher satisfaction with their pay and job security.  In contrast, workers on non-contingent compensation 
schemes seem to be unambiguously more satisfied with the hours (and times) of work compared to those 
on PRP.  Individuals in receipt of PRP are also found to be more dissatisfied in terms of their relations 
with their boss, their use of initiative and, in particular, the level of workload, work tension and job stress.  
In general those in receipt of PRP are the least satisfied group of employees, while those paid 
performance bonuses are usually happier than individuals on time rates.  
[INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE] 
 
4. Methodology and Econometric Issues 
 
For the rest of the paper a multivariate regression methodology is employed in order to uncover the true 
ceteris paribus influence of the incentive pay variables on JS.  The empirical framework that is used 
assumes that (either partial or overall) JS of individual i (i = 1,…, N) in time period t (t = 1,…,T) is a 
function of a vector of individual and job characteristics:  
 
ittititititit uGSPRPJS ++++++= TJcX 654321 ββββββ  (1) 
 
 
where PRP is an indicator capturing whether the individual is working under a performance-based 
scheme, GS differentiates between those workers who have received a gain-sharing bonus and those who 
have not, X is a vector of other individual variables assumed to influence JS, Jc captures a set of 
conventional employment-related factors (used in previous studies in the literature), T is a vector of 
yearly dummy variables capturing the presence of fixed time effects (such as changing technologies or 
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shifting managerial styles, both of which could potentially affect the relationship of PRP and JS), the β’s 
are associated coefficients, and uit is a randomly distributed error term with E(uit| X, Jc, T) = 0.   
OLS estimation of equation (1) is likely to reveal a distorted effect of PRP and GS on JS given the 
presence of unobserved individual and job heterogeneity.  Such heterogeneity is likely to be particularly 
pronounced in the case under study, due to both non-random sorting of workers into particular wage 
schemes as well as the non-systematic offer of contingent-rewards by firms.  Specifically, Lazear’s (1986) 
model has convincingly illustrated that firms offering PRP are likely to attract workers of higher ability, 
ambition or talent, while Fernie and Metcalfe (1999), McLeod and Parent (1999) and Belfield and 
Marsden (2003) have emphasized the importance of the monitoring environment in the firm’s decision 
whether to offer PRP.  Given that these characteristics, which are likely to be correlated with both the 
incentive pay and JS variables, are usually unobserved, it follows that an OLS regression will lead to 
inconsistent estimates.   
In order to overcome this omitted variables problem, equation (1) is estimated in this study by, first, 
using a fixed effects model of panel analysis on the BHPS dataset,iv and, subsequently, controlling for a 
number of previously omitted job-related variables using the EPICURUS database.  With this strategy it 
hence becomes possible not only to confirm the ceteris paribus influence of incentive pay on JS, purged 
of any unobserved heterogeneity, but also to infer the impact of the interaction between contingent 
rewards and a number of previously unavailable job-specific factors on individual JS.       
In addition to (1), the following equation is thus also estimated: 
 
itiitititititit GSPRPJS ηεβββββββ ++++++++= tTJucJcX 7654321  (2) 
 
where, as is standard (Wooldridge, 2002), the idiosyncratic disturbance term uit is split into the time-
invariant fixed individual effect, εi, and a pure random error term, ηit, with E(ηit) = 0 and E(εi, ηit) = 0, 
while Juc is a vector of non-standard regressors that capture specific characteristics of an employee’s job 
(such as the nature of the job task, the level of teamwork, the quality of the working environment etc).   
 14
As the dependent variable (JS) is ordinal in nature, statistical models such as (1) and (2) usually make 
use of an ordered probit estimator (with random or fixed effects).  Ferrer-i-Carbonell and Fritjers (2004) 
and Van Praag and Ferrer-i-Carbonell (2004) have nevertheless shown that well-being models utilizing 
fixed effects or other complicated estimators can be consistently estimated with the use of a linear Probit 
OLS (POLS) methodology.  Such a technique transforms the ordered responses to a JS question into a 
linear scale, by using an approximation that takes the frequency distribution of the variable into account 
(Maddala, 1983).  It has been shown that the estimates obtained with this method can be converted back 
to those of an ordered probit estimator via an appropriate multiplication factor and that statistical 
inference is unaffected.  Moreover, such a monotonic transformation makes the empirical process 
relatively inexpensive and permits the use of complicated linear econometric tools.  The POLS 
methodology has therefore been adopted in this study.v   
 
5. Econometric Results 
5.1 Conventional Estimates of Job Satisfaction 
The regression results in Table 3 show the effect of individual and job characteristics on overall JS in the 
UK.  The specification that has been selected follows closely that in Green and Heywood (2008) and has 
been kept as consistent as possible across both datasets.  In examining the findings in columns (1) and (3), 
which present OLS estimates of equation (1) on the BHPS and the EPICURUS dataset, respectively, it is 
notable that both datasets show that only performance bonuses have a positive and significant impact on 
JS, thus confirming the evidence of previous studies in the literature.  By breaking up the question on 
bonuses and profit-sharing into two distinct components, the EPICURUS dataset also reveals that it is end 
of the year bonuses that are mostly appreciated by employees.  Individual PRP, in contrast, is not found to 
have any significant effect on JS.  It is important to notice that these effects are robust to the inclusion of 
the level of pay and of work hours which are mostly influenced by the receipt of contingent pay, while the 
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regressions have also controlled for occupational and sectoral differences in the jobs that individuals 
perform.    
The influence of the remaining covariates is in accordance with previous findings in the literature, 
though a number of important variables are statistically insignificant in the EPICURUS survey, 
presumably due to the smaller sample size and the lack of sufficient variability in some of the regressors 
resulting from the homogeneity of the sample.  For example, the level of pay, working hours, age, 
education and firm size are not found to significantly affect JS in the EPICURUS sample.  Nonetheless, 
the gender and union paradoxes are confirmed, whereby females and non-union employees appear to be 
more satisfied.  Permanent contract jobs with promotion opportunities are also found to yield higher JS, 
though those working on the employer’s premises and on jobs requiring more commuting time appear to 
be more dissatisfied.     
[INSERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE] 
 
5.2 Estimates of Job Satisfaction Controlling for Unobserved Heterogeneity 
The relationship between incentive pay and JS reported in the previous section is likely to be biased due 
to the presence of unobserved heterogeneity.  As was argued above, the researcher cannot be certain that a 
consistent estimate of variable pay on JS has been obtained with the use of least squares, due to sorting of 
workers and jobs across different pay regimes.  Instead, the coefficients on the incentive pay dummy 
variables might be capturing the impact on satisfaction of differential person- and job-specific traits which 
are correlated with the propensity of individuals to belong to either mode of pay and, simultaneously, 
enhance their JS.   
For this reason, columns (2) and (4) of Table 3 report the estimated coefficients of regressions that 
either purge the existence of time-invariant effects or control for a set of non-typical workplace factors.  
Comparing this to the conventional specification in columns (1) and (3), where no such corrections were 
introduced, interesting differences arise.  In particular, the robustness of the positive effect of bonuses on 
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JS is confirmed, though it is slightly reduced in magnitude.  The coefficients of a number of the remaining 
independent variables which are potentially correlated with unobserved characteristics (e.g. age, union 
status, managerial duties) have also been affected accordingly.  
Importantly, the EPICURUS survey allows the examination of the effect of some previously 
unexplored job factors on JS.  For instance, it can be seen that a system of rotating shifts and jobs 
involving a variety of duties yield higher utility to workers compared to fixed time schedules and standard 
workplace routines, respectively.  Non-repetitive jobs are also significantly appreciated, as are jobs which 
are perceived as being of higher quality in terms of the physical environment.  Finally, individuals who 
enjoy a happy relationship with their supervisors and colleagues are found to be more satisfied workers, 
which also can explain the significant disutility associated with rotating teams.                
 
5.3 Interaction effects between incentive pay and job-specific characteristics 
With the use of the information made available by the EPICURUS survey, is possible to investigate how 
the various incentive pay tools interact with a number of relevant job characteristics in terms of affecting 
the overall well-being of employees.  The coefficients of such interactive terms, added in the estimation 
of equation (2) in turn, are presented in Table 4.  Interesting conclusions are drawn, as it is shown that the 
marginal impact of gain-sharing bonuses on JS is greater among higher-paid workers in the sample, which 
is in line with the finding of McCausland et al. (2005).  This is also the case for those employees 
suffering wider pay inequities relative to comparable workers, as performance bonuses are presumably 
viewed as instruments that can rectify such pay imbalances (Brown, 2001).  PRP is found to have a 
greater effect on the JS of permanent contract employees, which may be explained by the fact that 
workers on insecure jobs are averse to the risk and uncertainty inherent in variable pay schemes.  
Furthermore, in contrast to the findings of Green and Heywood (2008) and Artz (2008), no significant 
differences in the effect of incentive pay on JS are found by gender, while the marginal benefit of fixed-
period bonuses is reduced as the size of the establishment increases.     
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Green and Heywood (2008) report a greater role for PRP among unionized workers.  They attribute 
this paradoxical result to international evidence illustrating that when unions are involved in the creation 
and implementation of PRP schemes, such modes of pay enjoy a greater probability of success.  Since the 
EPICURUS dataset allows the identification of whether the respondents’ current firm is covered by a 
collective wage agreement that is negotiated by a trade union, the above hypothesis is tested via 
appropriate interaction terms.  It is clear from Table 4 that PRP systems are associated with employee 
disutility only for those workers whose collective bargaining agreement is not negotiated by a trade union.  
This provides some indirect evidence in favour of the hypothesis put forward by Green and Heywood 
(2008). 
Examining the interaction of incentive pay and job-specific characteristics closer, it can also be seen 
that discretionary bonuses are more likely to have a beneficial impact on the JS of workers performing 
autonomous jobs, as opposed to those engaged in fixed routines.  This also holds for jobs which are 
perceived as being of superior quality in terms of the physical environment.  Indeed, the “case studies of 
call centres by Drago (1996) and Fernie and Metcalfe (1999) present bleak pictures of low wages and 
high stress made worse by computerized monitoring and piece rates” (Green and Heywood, 2008, p.711).  
It is also evident that performance bonuses have a greater utility impact among individuals who work 
longer hours and who believe that their work is physically tiring, which constitutes evidence of the 
potential of variable pay policies to reward hard-working individuals accordingly.  Finally, there is 
evidence of a smaller utility effect of performance bonuses for those individuals who work in teams.  This 
is expected, given that the relations among co-workers within an organization are likely to be strained by 
the existence of a PRP system (Marsden and French, 1998). 
[INSERT TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE] 
 
5.4 Estimates of the effect of incentive pay on partial job satisfactions 
The EPICURUS dataset permits the investigation of the impact of incentive pay on a much richer set of 
facets of jobs compared to the BHPS.  Table 5 summarizes the direction and statistical significance of 
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these effects for both datasets.  Performance-based pay systems are found to have a positive impact on the 
satisfaction that workers receive from their pay, which is expected given the higher mean earnings that 
they typically entail (Seiler, 1984; Brown, 1992; Booth and Frank, 1999; Parent, 1999; Lazear, 2000).  
They are also associated with greater satisfaction with job security, despite the assertion that PRP 
practises can act as a signal of low tolerance for sub-standard productivity by firms (Lazear, 2000, p. 
1355).  Employees on gain-sharing schemes are generally more satisfied with their relationship with their 
employers, their work load and their promotion prospects.  Importantly, individuals receiving PRP are 
found to be significantly less satisfied with their working hours and the level of job stress, suggesting that 
such schemes may be placing a psychological strain on workers.  
[INSERT TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE] 
 
6. Discussion 
The insignificant coefficient of PRP in the overall JS regressions gives credence to the fundamental 
microeconomic model, which predicts that in the long-run the marginal utilities of ‘similar’ employees on 
different compensation plans should be equalized.  In contrast, it is interesting to notice that the effect of 
gain-sharing schemes (in particular fixed-term bonuses) on employee well-being is quite robust.  There is 
therefore an important asymmetry in the way in which individual and gain-sharing incentives affect the 
well-being of employees.                
In addition, no evidence is uncovered in this study to suggest that having pay tied to performance 
leads to greater feelings of insecurity among workers, which might arise due to substitution of firms away 
from long-term attachments with their employees.  After all, employers are usually faced with more than 
one managerial problem, so there is no reason to believe that they trade-off the various incentive tools 
available to them.  Moreover, PRP can ultimately provide firms with adequate flexibility to respond to the 
vagaries of the business cycle.   
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The evidence also does not support the view that incentive pay reduces the ‘intrinsic’ satisfaction of 
workers, since no statistical relationship is found between the PRP variable and the satisfaction that 
workers derive from the work itself or the use of initiative, used here as surrogates for the intrinsic 
motivation of workers.  Nonetheless, the finding of a significant difference in pay satisfaction is 
reassuring, given that most studies have found that the mean wage of workers receiving incentive pay is 
higher relative to those who are paid hourly rates or salaries. 
Finally, the notable differences in the size and significance of the coefficients that are reported in 
Table 3 highlight the importance of taking the heterogeneous nature of employee and job characteristics 
into account when examining the effect of contingent-rewards on JS.   
 
7. Conclusions 
 
In recent years firms have not only focused on increasing the flexibility of the external aspects of the 
employment relationship (e.g. hiring/firing, contractual arrangements, outsourcing), but have embarked 
on internal flexibility as well.  This has entailed (among others) the restructuring of the workplace in a 
manner that gives emphasis to financial flexibility, such as the widespread provision of incentive reward 
schemes (bonuses, piece-rates, stock options, profit sharing etc.), designed to motivate workers and 
increase the effort that they exert at their jobs.  The aim of this paper has therefore been to investigate the 
impact of such motivational instruments on the (stated) well-being of employees in the UK.  Using data 
from the BHPS and a unique cross-sectional survey of British workers, and after accounting for the 
presence of unobserved heterogeneity, the main theoretical prediction of the conventional microeconomic 
paradigm was confirmed, namely that no significant difference in the job utility of workers should arise 
between those receiving PRP and those on alternative methods of pay.  Nevertheless, an important 
asymmetry in the manner in which individual and gain-sharing incentives affect JS is found, as only the 
latter exert a positive effect on employee well-being.  Moreover, doubt is cast on arguments that incentive 
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pay is likely to crowd-out the intrinsic satisfaction of work and on concerns regarding the adverse impact 
of PRP schemes on job security.   
An important contribution of this study is that it has been able to detect the impact on JS that arises 
from the interaction between various incentive pay tools and specific job characteristics that were 
previously unexplored in the literature.  It has been confirmed that consideration of the organizational 
environment and the nature of the job task is crucial for the design of compensation policies that will 
successfully enhance the well-being of the workforce.  To further purse the investigation of these issues 
requires more informative datasets that will facilitate additional empirical research focussing explicitly on 
the link between organizational characteristics and the provision of performance-related rewards.   
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TABLE 1 DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS BY INCIDENCE OF INCENTIVE PAY 
 BHPS EPICURUS 
Variables Yes No Yes No 
(%)     
Demographic     
Male 57.12 43.44 44.23 40.34 
Partner 73.19 72.13 65.60 69.02 
Educ: Below Tertiary  82.46 81.58 100.00 100.00 
       - Above Tertiary 17.54 18.42   
Job-related (standard)     
Union  46.48 53.98 16.04 22.03 
Promotion 59.50 46.17 51.04 32.75 
Full-time 87.46 76.22 83.04 76.71 
Contract: Permanent 98.55 93.67 94.84 84.87 
Sector: Private 82.26 57.21 77.15 55.13 
Firm Size: 1-24 30.67 36.54 33.66 36.22 
        - 25-99 24.48 27.68 21.78 22.01 
        - 100-499 25.86 20.14 24.01 20.62 
         - 500+ 18.99 15.64 20.54 21.14 
Occupation: Managers and Admin 20.25 10.69 9.63 4.22 
        - Professional  8.45 11.43 3.95 5.07 
        - Ass. Prof. and Technical 10.5 12.92 5.93 6.76 
        - Clerical and Secretarial  20.09 16.89 31.36 32.09 
        - Craft & Related 10.48 9.33 1.98 2.2 
        - Personal & Protective Srv  5.14 15.33 1.48 3.72 
         - Sales  9.8 6.17 20.49 11.66 
         - Plant  & Machine Oper. 9.32 8.5 3.7 3.72 
         - Other  5.97 8.74 21.49 30.57 
Job-related (extended)     
Working times: Same   52.22 49.66 
          - Rotating   14.29 17.34 
          - Variable   33.50 33.00 
Shift work   38.08 32.77 
Teamwork: Same people   60.15 58.32 
          - Changing teams   21.29 19.83 
          - Work on own   18.56 21.85 
Nature of task: Fixed routine   21.39 23.76 
          - Variety of duties   70.90 66.67 
          - Autonomy   7.71 9.57 
Repetitiveness: Yes   23.08 7.71 
         - Sometimes   68.98 63.88 
         - No   7.94 10.39 
Hardtask   59.64 52.36 
Job Dangerous: Hardly ever  
(risk of physical accidents,  
contact with dangerous products) 
  78.57 70.02 
Job Quality: Hardly ever  
(noisy, dirty, hot) 
  63.55 57.58 
Job Physically Tiring: Hardly ever   45.81 39.56 
Good relationship co-workers   69.88 71.55 
Good relationship supervisor   86.88 82.34 
Means     
Age 37.58 39.33 32.90 36.66 
Hourly wage 7.65 6.44 7.65 7.05 
Usual Weekly hours 36.12 33.12 38.19 35.57 
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TABLE 2 MEAN JOB SATISFACTION BY FACETS OF JOBS AND MODE  
OF INCENTIVE PAY 
  BHPS EPICURUS 
Facets  
Bonus PRP 
Bonus 
+PRP 
No Bonus PRP 
Bonus 
+PRP 
No 
JS  5.37 5.31 5.27 5.37 6.63 6.06 6.65 6.20 
pay  5.03 4.99 5.09 4.89 5.69 4.50 5.64 4.47 
job security  5.57 5.55 5.45 5.46 6.80 6.74 7.06 6.24 
work itself  5.40 5.35 5.34 5.47 6.72 6.76 6.62 6.52 
total working hours  5.19 5.14 5.06 5.26 6.71 5.74 6.73 6.57 
relations with boss      7.11 6.15 7.33 6.43 
use of own initiative      7.02 6.53 7.20 6.77 
promotion prospects      4.90 4.12 5.20 4.11 
working times (e.g. shifts)      6.75 6.38 6.84 6.48 
employer's behaviour      6.55 5.35 6.16 5.60 
work load      6.38 5.85 5.91 5.97 
work tension      6.00 5.00 5.62 5.58 
level of job stress      5.80 4.71 5.58 5.45 
physical risk      7.37 6.84 7.86 6.81 
Notes: JS is measured on a 1-7 (1-10) Likert scale in the BHPS (EPICURUS) dataset. 
 
 
 
 
 
TABLE 3  EFFECT OF INCENTIVE PAY ON JOB SATISFACTION 
  BHPS EPICURUS 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  POLS FE POLS POLS 
  Standard  Standard Extended 
INCENTIVE PAY      
PRP   -0.004 0.031 -0.019 -0.021 
  (0.021) (0.019) (0.143) (0.156) 
Bonus + Profit Sharing (GS)  0.043*** 0.022* 0.127 0.121 
  (0.014) (0.013) (0.097) (0.093) 
End of Year Bonus (GS)    0.201** 0.196** 
    (0.102) (0.089) 
PRP + GS  -0.009 0.022 0.093 0.029 
  (0.020) (0.018) (0.101) (0.098) 
DEMOGRAPHIC      
Male  -0.132***  -0.287*** -0.233*** 
  (0.016)  (0.082) (0.079) 
Age  -0.022*** -0.024 0.002 -0.015 
  (0.004) (0.016) (0.022) (0.022) 
Age Square  0.000*** 0.000 0.000 0.000 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Partner  0.077*** 0.008 0.001 0.005 
  (0.015) (0.019) (0.067) (0.062) 
EDUCATION       
Upper Secondary  0.060**  -0.345 -0.248 
  (0.027)  (0.250) (0.252) 
Lower Secondary  0.113***    
  (0.020)    
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None  0.213***    
  (0.029)    
JOB-RELATED (STANDARD) 
 
 
    
Employer Premises  -0.051*** -0.047*** -0.217** -0.171* 
  (0.017) (0.018) (0.092) (0.092) 
Ln(Pay)  0.119*** 0.135*** 0.074 0.033 
  (0.018) (0.019) (0.066) (0.060) 
Comparison Pay  -0.082*** -0.019 0.093 0.243 
  (0.027) (0.025) (0.246) (0.252) 
Ln (Week Hours)  -0.198*** -0.102*** -0.023 -0.019 
  (0.019) (0.022) (0.123) (0.129) 
Weekly Overtime  0.001 0.001* 0.009 0.014** 
  (0.001) (0.001) (0.007) (0.007) 
Permanent Contract  0.123*** 0.044* 0.195** 0.195** 
  (0.025) (0.026) (0.092) (0.095) 
Commuting Time  -0.001*** -0.000 -0.004** -0.004** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.002) (0.002) 
Incremental Pay Rise  0.118*** 0.096***   
  (0.012) (0.010)   
Promotion  0.183*** 0.205*** 0.700*** 0.554*** 
  (0.012) (0.011) (0.066) (0.068) 
Union  -0.124*** -0.029* -0.185** -0.046 
  (0.015) (0.015) (0.079) (0.078) 
JOB DUTIES      
Manager  0.040** -0.026   
  (0.020) (0.018)   
Supervisor  -0.013 -0.028**   
  (0.016) (0.014)   
SECTOR      
Civil Service  -0.025 0.079** -0.096 -0.119 
  (0.034) (0.039) (0.116) (0.119) 
Local Government  0.084*** 0.167*** 
  (0.025) (0.029) 
NHS/Higher Educ.  0.110*** 0.187*** 
  (0.029) (0.035) 
0.001 
(0.085) 
-0.072 
(0.085) 
Other  0.047 0.142***   
  (0.045) (0.039)   
Non-Profit Orgs  0.089*** 0.176*** 0.142 0.067 
  (0.032) (0.037) (0.145) (0.135) 
FIRM SIZE      
25-99  -0.095*** -0.036** 0.060 0.089 
  (0.015) (0.014) (0.088) (0.084) 
100-499  -0.147*** -0.065*** -0.026 0.046 
  (0.017) (0.017) (0.089) (0.087) 
500+  -0.138*** -0.057*** 0.033 0.040 
  (0.019) (0.020) (0.091) (0.089) 
JOB-RELATED (EXTENDED) 
 
 
    
Working Time Schedules      
Rotating shifts      0.170* 
      (0.089) 
Variable      0.025 
      (0.073) 
Shifts (Sat/Sun/night)      -0.042 
      (0.077) 
Nature of job task       
Variety of duties      0.202** 
      (0.087) 
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Autonomy      0.099 
      (0.137) 
REPETITIVENESS       
Sometimes      0.220** 
      (0.085) 
No      0.416*** 
      (0.119) 
TIRING       
Sometimes      0.107 
      (0.094) 
Hardly ever      0.054 
      (0.095) 
Hard Task 
(High speed + tight deadlines) 
 
 
 
 
   0.008 
      (0.014) 
Quality of work environment       
Sometimes Low       0.297*** 
      (0.111) 
Hardly ever Low      0.341*** 
      (0.112) 
DANGEROUSNESS       
Sometimes      -0.033 
      (0.130) 
Hardly ever      0.037 
      (0.135) 
Workplace Relationships       
Good relations Supervisor      0.567*** 
      (0.111) 
Good relations Colleagues      0.379*** 
      (0.069) 
TEAMWORK       
Rotating teams      -0.136* 
      (0.081) 
No teams      0.026 
      (0.087) 
Occupation dummies   YES YES YES YES 
Industry dummies   YES YES YES YES 
Region dummies   YES YES NO NO 
Constant   0.980*** 0.553 -0.485 -1.995** 
   (0.131) (0.529) (0.900) (0.943) 
N  
(Individuals)   
43118 
(10776) 
43540 
(10907) 
762 719 
R2    0.06 0.03 0.21 0.36 
F(vars, clusters)   21.62*** 15.82*** 6.30*** 8.42*** 
Corr(ui, xb)    -0.37   
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; Omitted categories: Incentive Pay: No; 
Education: First/Higher (BHPS)/Below upper secondary (EPICURUS); Job Duties: Not manager/supervisor; Sector: 
Private; Firm Size: 1-24; Working time: Same every day; Nature of job task: Fixed routine; Repetitiveness: Yes; Tiring: 
Yes; Job Quality: Frequently Low; Dangerousness: Frequently; Teamwork: Non-rotating teams. 
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TABLE 4 INTERACTION EFFECTS BETWEEN MODES OF PAY AND INDIVIDUAL  
AND JOB CHARACTERISTICS, EPICURUS DATABASE 
 
Bonus + 
Profit Sharing 
End of Year  
Bonus 
PRP 
PRP + 
 GS 
Male 0.04 -0.04 0.44 0.11 
 (0.18) (0.18) (0.29) (0.18) 
Ln(Pay) 0.52** 0.21 -0.19 -0.17 
 (0.12) (0.18) (0.43) (0.14) 
Comparison Pay 0.84** 0.08 0.27 0.22 
 (0.36) (0.39) (0.61) (0.40) 
Ln(Week Hours) 0.21 -0.36 0.52* 0.02 
 (0.24) (0.27) (0.31) (0.32) 
Permanent  0.16 -0.34 0.83** 0.13 
 (0.24) (0.43) (0.37) (0.29) 
Collective bargaining agreement     
      - Yes, but not negotiated by trade union -0.69** 0.03 -0.97** 0.19 
 (0.31) (0.30) (0.49) (0.33) 
      - Yes, but negotiated by trade union -0.02 -0.12 -0.36 -0.05 
 (0.23) (0.25) (0.43) (0.24) 
Firm Size: 25-99 -0.22 -0.40* 0.24 -0.15 
 (0.27) (0.24) (0.32) (0.30) 
      - 100-499 -0.22 -0.49** 0.40 -0.12 
 (0.24) (0.24) (0.38) (0.24) 
     - 500+ -0.16 -0.44** -0.12 0.22 
 (0.25) (0.23) (0.63) (0.27) 
Nature of job task: Autonomy 0.01 0.76* -0.07 0.31 
 (0.39) (0.42) (0.41) (0.34) 
Low Quality: Hardly ever 0.64** 0.68** -0.25 -0.17 
 (0.32) (0.32) (0.29) (0.24) 
Tiring: Sometimes -0.31 -0.68*** -0.35 -0.42** 
 (0.26) (0.25) (0.42) (0.21) 
    - Hardly ever 0.08 -0.61** -0.05 -0.13 
 (0.26) (0.25) (0.37) (0.22) 
Teamwork: Rotating teams -0.65** -0.55* 0.53 -0.22 
 (0.29) (0.29) (0.44) (0.29) 
    - Same teams -0.48** -0.29 0.35 -0.26 
 (0.23) (0.25) (0.32) (0.23) 
Notes:  The interaction terms have been added in turn to an extended specification (similar to Column 4, Table 3); 
Omitted categories: Collective Bargaining: No; Firm Size: 1-24; Nature of job task: Fixed routine; Tiring: Yes; Job 
Quality: Frequently Low; Teamwork: Non-rotating teams. 
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TABLE 5 EFFECT OF MODES OF INCENTIVE PAY ON FACETS OF JOB 
SATISFACTION 
 BHPS EPICURUS 
Facets PRP GS PRP+GS 
Bonus +  
PS  
End of Year 
Bonus PRP PRP+GS 
pay +*** +*** +*** +*** +***  +*** 
job security +** +*** +*** +** +**  +*** 
work itself  __ *      
total working hours      -***  
relations with boss    +** +***  +* 
use of own initiative        
promotion prospects    +** +*   
working times (e.g. shifts)        
employer's behaviour    +*** +***   
work load     +*   
work tension        
level of job stress      __**  
physical risk       +* 
Notes: The direction and statistical significance levels have been derived from separate POLS regressions using 
facets of JS as dependent variables.  BHPS: fixed effects estimates (similar to Column 2, Table 3); EPICURUS: 
estimates of an extended specification (similar to Column 4, Table 3). 
 
 
 
 
 
Endnotes 
                                                 
i For instance, financial rewards based on performance may be perceived by workers as signals that the employment relationship is a pure market 
exchange (Kreps, 1997, p. 363).  More recently, Benabou and Tirole (2003) also allowed for the possibility that incentive rewards may alter the 
intrinsic motivation of agents, by affecting their information sets concerning the nature of the task they perform or their uncertain self-confidence. 
ii The experimental evidence of Eriksson and Villeval (2004) corroborates this assertion, as it shows that in a setting representing a long-term 
employer-employee relationship with reciprocity and inequality aversion, a non-negligible fraction of the high-skilled subjects, who in accordance 
with the theory would have previously selected to work in variable pay schemes, now opt for a fixed pay scheme.  This points to the importance of 
other-regarding preferences when employees select their preferred method of remuneration. 
iii This is consistent with McKersie et al.’s (1964) evidence of a positive association between layoff prevalence and incentive prevalence.   
iv  Clark and Oswald (2002) have shown that fixed-effects well-being equations have a similar structure to cross-section equations.   
v The estimates based on an ordered probit technique reveal no significant differences compared to those reported in this paper, which use the POLS 
transformation.  They are readily available from the authors upon request. 
